• Apply the documented storage-name checks consistently on all platforms, including reserved names and embedded NUL characters.
• Keep capability-check and web storage failures inside the typed BiometricVaultException hierarchy.
• Fix Android capability checks with device-credential fallback on Android 10 and earlier. Reject invalid authentication validity windows before native key creation, and allow unauthenticated stores to ignore these authentication-only options.
• Stop Darwin silent writes when deleting the previous Keychain item fails, and clear stale prompt text when reusing an authentication context.
• Reject malformed Linux method-channel arguments without weakening the authentication requirement, and release temporary native response values.
• Update the Windows dependency to win32 6.4 and Android build tooling to Flutter's supported AGP 9.1 / Gradle 9.3.1 combination in the example. The plugin inherits the consuming app's AGP and Kotlin versions. Use stable AndroidX Biometric 1.1.0 and Fragment 1.9.1.
• Declare the Flutter framework dependency explicitly in the iOS and macOS Swift packages. The minimum Flutter 3.44 / Dart 3.12 requirement and stored data formats are unchanged.
• Add the Face ID usage description required by the iOS example.

No runtime changes.

• AI coding-assistant support: the repository now ships an installable agent plugin for Claude Code and OpenAI Codex with four package-specific skills: integrate-biometric-vault (integration with per-platform setup), troubleshoot-biometric-vault (symptom-to-fix diagnosis), test-with-biometric-vault (faking the vault in consumer tests), and migrate-from-biometric-storage (safe API and data migration). See the "AI coding-assistant support" section of the README for installation.
• Repository-level agent guidance (AGENTS.md) and a plugin validation script (tool/validate_agent_plugin.dart) wired into CI. The plugin tree is distributed from the Git repository and excluded from the pub.dev archive.

• StorageFileInitOptions.silentWrites: writes never show an authentication prompt while reads stay gated. Android uses envelope encryption (payload under a fresh AES-256-GCM key, wrapped by a Keystore RSA public key whose private half is authentication-gated); iOS and macOS replace the keychain item on write, which never evaluates its access control.
• BiometricVault.biometryType(): reports the device biometry modality (Face ID, Touch ID, Optic ID, fingerprint, face, iris) so UI copy can name the actual authenticator.
• BiometricVault.authenticate(): standalone user authentication without any storage, for app-lock style privacy gates. Supports biometric-only mode or device-credential fallback.

Initial stable release of biometric_vault: encrypted storage for small secrets (tokens, passwords, key material) with optional biometric protection.

Features #

• Named encrypted stores with a four-call lifecycle: canAuthenticate(), getStorage(), then read() / write() / delete().
• Android 7.0+ (API 24): AES-GCM key in the Android Keystore (StrongBox when available, TEE fallback), gated by BiometricPrompt with Class 3 biometrics and optional device-credential fallback. All keystore and file work runs off the main thread, and writes are atomic.
• iOS 13+ / macOS 10.15+: Keychain items protected by SecAccessControl (Face ID / Touch ID / Apple Watch, optional passcode fallback), shipped as a Swift Package Manager package with a CocoaPods fallback. Keychain operations run off the main thread.
• Linux (libsecret), Windows (Credential Manager), and web (localStorage, not secure) backends so cross-platform code keeps working without authentication support.
• Typed, sealed error model: every failure is a subtype of the sealed BiometricVaultException (AuthException with 14 dedicated AuthExceptionCode values, StorageInvalidatedException with a StorageInvalidatedReason, or BiometricVaultPluginException), so a single switch handles all outcomes exhaustively and raw PlatformExceptions never escape.
• Precise capability reporting: canAuthenticate() distinguishes biometry lockout (errorLockedOut) and pending security updates (errorSecurityUpdateRequired) from generic hardware unavailability.
• StorageFileInitOptions with explicit per-platform durations (androidAuthenticationValidityDuration, darwinTouchIDAuthenticationAllowableReuseDuration, darwinTouchIDAuthenticationForceReuseContextDuration) and per-platform biometricOnly flags. Invalid store names or option combinations throw ArgumentError at getStorage instead of failing natively at first use.
• Localizable prompt strings via PromptInfo (AndroidPromptInfo and DarwinPromptInfo).